Presented by Volker Nocke
University of Mannheim, Professor of Economics
This PhD-level mini-course covers selected topics in the theory of antitrust economics. The focus will be on recent work on two key issues in competition policy: horizontal mergers and vertical restraints.
Horizontal mergers happen between firms competing in the same market. The traditional approach to the review of horizontal mergers by an antitrust authority stresses the static trade-off between the market power effect of the merger and potential merger-specific efficiencies. Recent work extends this view by addressing the following issues: What does the optimal (dynamic) merger approval policy look like if merger opportunities are not isolated events but occur frequently over time? What does the optimal merger approval policy look like if a merger proposal is in itself the outcome of choice by firms among alternative mergers? What does the optimal (dynamic) merger approval policy look like if merger and merger policy can affect firms’ investment incentives?
The course is free but RSVPs are required. Email email@example.com to confirm your attendance.
About the speaker
Volker Nocke is Professor of Economics at the University of Mannheim, holding the Chair in Microeconomics since September 2009. He is a member of the European Commission’s Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP), member of the Council of the European Economic Association, member of the Executive and Steering Committees of the Association of Competition Economics (ACE), and Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory. He is a Research Fellow of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, a Fellow of the CESifo Research Network, Munich, and a Senior Member of the Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation (MaCCI). In 2012, he was awarded a 5-year Starting Grant by the European Research Council (ERC).